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NOTES
CALLING BALLS AND ST RIKES? CHIEF JUSTICE
ROBERTS IN OCTOBER T ERM 2019
Meghan Dalton*
INTRODUCTION
At the confirmation hearing following his nomination to serve as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, then-Judge
John G. Roberts, Jr. made an analogy that members of the Judiciary
Committee referred to with vigor over the course of the confirmation
process1 and that commentators have often returned to when
discussing the Roberts Court in the fifteen years since.2 During his
opening statement, Roberts compared the role of a judge to that of an
umpire: “I will decide every case based on the record, according to the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2022; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science and Psychology, University of Notre Dame, 2017. I am thankful to
Professor Randy Kozel for advising this Note and all his helpful feedback. Thank you to my
colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for their tireless work editing this Note and all
pieces we publish. I am particularly grateful for the unending support of my family and
friends, especially my parents. All errors are my own.
1 The word “umpire” was used thirty-nine times during the confirmation hearing.
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter
Confirmation Hearing]. After Roberts made the comparison during his opening statement,
Senators on both sides of the aisle made reference to the metaphor in their questioning.
Some, such as Chuck Grassley, noted that it showed Roberts’s commitment to impartiality,
while others, including Joe Biden, used it to question Roberts’s true intent. Id. at 177
(statement of Se. Chuck Grassley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 186
(statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“So Judge, you
are going to be an inferer. You are not going to be an umpire. Umpires do not infer.”).
2 See, e.g., Jennifer Finney Boylan, Opinion, Getting Beyond Balls and Strikes, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/opinion/getting-beyond-ballsand-strikes.html [https://perma.cc/FE36-RQSG]; Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges, N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12weber
.html [https://perma.cc/R6TF-8UEL]; I Come with “No Agenda,” Roberts Tells Hearing, CNN
(Sept. 13, 2005), https://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.hearings/
[https://perma.cc/FUL6-CHRF].
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rule of law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability, and I will
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or
bat.”3 The Committee took kindly to this metaphor, as well as
Roberts’s amiable demeanor and extensive experience as an advocate
before the Supreme Court, and he was confirmed in the Senate by a
vote of seventy-eight to twenty-two.4
As Chief Justice, Roberts has publicly demonstrated a
commitment to this characterization of the Court as a passive
institution and of the judge’s role as “to suppress his or her ideological
agenda in the interest of achieving consensus and stability.”5 This
representation, however, does not leave Roberts powerless to influence
the direction of the law while working within the confines of the rules
of the Court. While the Chief Justice is often referred to as the “first
among equals,” a nod to the fact that each Justice’s vote counts equally
in determining the resolution of the cases that come before the Court,
there is “[r]arely . . . equality in practice.”6 By virtue of his position as
Chief Justice, Roberts enjoys various procedural responsibilities that
allow him to shape the law in ways that his colleagues cannot.7 One
such responsibility is the assignment power, by which the Chief Justice

3 Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 56.
4 U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress–1st Session, U.S. SENATE, https://www
.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session
=1&vote=00245 [https://perma.cc/9B5V-SH3E]. It is notable that Roberts earned the
support of fifty-one percent of opposing party senators, “a far better showing than other
[recent] Supreme Court nominees.” Joel K. Goldstein, Leading the Court: Studies in Influence
as Chief Justice, 40 STETSON L. REV. 717, 758 (2011). “[H]is evident talent and his ability to
project a comforting judicial disposition” during the confirmation process “attracted
widespread praise.” Id.; see also Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th
Chief Justice, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive
/politics/2005/09/30/roberts-confirmed-as-17th-chief-justice/f0b7282a-8efe-43d5-bf5aad74babe2c99/ [https://perma.cc/R62J-UK57] (noting that Roberts “drew rave reviews
from many senators” during his “almost flawless confirmation process”).
5 Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2007), https://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/ [https://perma.cc
/96CS-W8GM].
6 David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme
Court, in THE CHIEF JUSTICE: APPOINTMENT AND INFLUENCE 19, 19 (David J. Danelski &
Artemus Ward eds., 2016).
7 See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 718 (“The formal powers of the Chief Justice
regarding the Court’s work are few—presiding at conference and assigning opinions when
in the majority—and the linkage between a Chief’s action and historic effect is often
inscrutable. Most of the activities that may significantly and distinctively affect the Court’s
work occur behind closed doors, obscured from the view of all but a few observers.”);
Theodore W. Ruger, The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 1551, 1562–67 (2006) (describing the development of the “Chief Justice’s
current discretionary authority”).
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is tasked with assigning the majority opinion.8 The assignment power
is “unique among the Chief’s duties in its ability to shape the
development of the law,” and is only available when the Chief falls in
the majority at the conference following oral arguments.9 This power,
when coupled with a high rate of voting in the majority, allows a Chief
Justice broad discretion to assign each opinion in a way which
comports with his or her goals for the Court.10 Chief Justice Roberts
has recorded a notably high rate of voting in the majority throughout
his tenure on the Court,11 but this trend reached a historic peak during
October Term 2019 when Roberts cast his vote with the majority
ninety-seven percent of the time.12 As a Chief Justice who almost always
votes in the majority, Roberts finds himself “uniquely positioned” to
strategically assign opinions in order to “control the narrative of the
court,” a position no Justice has occupied since Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes in the 1930s.13 Given the rare position in which Chief
Justice Roberts found himself in October Term 2019, this Note
explores to what extent Roberts may have used the assignment power
this term in order to pursue his goals, and whether those goals were
grounded in substantive policy outcomes, organizational concerns,
institutional legitimacy, or some combination thereof.
Part I of this Note will outline the scope of the assignment power,
focusing on the strategic considerations a Chief Justice can make in
assigning opinions. Part II will analyze Roberts’s voting and assignment patterns in October Term 2019, specifically applying the earlier
discussions to his assignment choices in three key cases decided this
term. Part III will focus on Chief Justice Roberts’s jurisprudential
values and explore how these concerns might have informed his
decision making in October Term 2019. Finally, this Note concludes
by asking to what extent Roberts’s recent assignment choices are

8 See Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1731 (2006).
9 Id. at 1730. If the Chief is not in the majority at conference, “the senior Associate
Justice in the majority receives the responsibility of assigning the opinion.” Id. at 1731.
10 Some have gone as far as to say that the assignment power “provides the Chief with
the capacity to direct the Court’s policy-making agenda.” Id. at 1730.
11 Adam Liptak, John Roberts Was Already Chief Justice. But Now It’s His Court, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/us/john-roberts-supreme-court
.html [https://perma.cc/VP6Q-LB2W] (“In his first 14 terms, [Roberts] was in the majority
about 88 percent of the time.”).
12 Nina Totenberg, Chief Justice John Roberts Rebuked Trump This Term. What’s He Up
To?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 10, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/10/889653156
/chief-justice-john-roberts-major-role-in-the-recent-supreme-court-term [https://perma.cc
/PX3U-BZ2Y] (“Roberts voted in the majority an astounding 97% of the time this term.”).
13 Id. (first quoting Richard Lazarus, then quoting Guy-Uriel Charles); see also Liptak,
supra note 11.
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consistent with his signature promise to “call balls and strikes,” and
whether Roberts will be able to continue to wield such widespread
influence on a changing Court.
I.

THE ASSIGNMENT POWER

“Although the Constitution is virtually silent about the offices of
the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,” the
parameters of the office of the Chief are understood today to include
various procedural and substantive duties.14 The Constitution only
explicitly tasks the Chief Justice with presiding over impeachment
trials.15 But “[t]hrough gradual statutory and customary accretion,”16
the office has come to include procedural duties as to the Supreme
Court, such as presiding over oral arguments and presenting each case
to the other Justices at conference,17 and duties and bureaucratic
powers as to the federal judiciary as whole.18 The assignment power is
regarded as one of the most potent tasks the Chief Justice undertakes,
due to the manner in which “the Chief Justice may seek to influence
the Court’s agenda and the course of legal development through the
exercise” of assigning opinions.19 Justice Felix Frankfurter characterized the assignment power as the Chief’s “single most influential
function.”20 This power “allows the chief justice . . . to frame whether
the opinion is going to be written by . . . a broad brush, or a narrow
one.”21 When making an assignment, the Chief must balance these
policy objectives with the expectations of the other Justices, as
“[f]ailure . . . to equitably distribute assignments across Justices will
14 G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1465–66 (2006).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Although impeachment trials are rare, Chief Justice
Roberts recently had the chance to exercise this constitutional power when President
Donald J. Trump was impeached in January 2020. Some observers noted that his role in
the impeachment trial came with little power to control the proceedings, a role that
“represents the polar opposite of his life at the Supreme Court.” Joan Biskupic, John Roberts
Presides Over the Impeachment Trial—But He Isn’t in Charge, CNN (Jan. 21, 2020), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/01/21/politics/john-roberts-trump-impeachment-trialstrategy/index.html [https://perma.cc/T3MB-FWDP].
16 Ruger, supra note 7, at 1552.
17 See Danelski, supra note 6, at 23–31 (discussing the ways in which the Chief Justice
can “influence his associates” first during oral arguments and later at conference).
18 See Ruger, supra note 7, at 1552 (“[T]he office has come to exercise a range of
bureaucratic powers that extend far beyond the Supreme Court’s walls, and influence the
federal judiciary as a whole. . . . [T]he Chief Justice currently presides over the important
Judicial Conference, which helps set judicial policy, appoints key managerial personnel in
the federal courts, and selects the judges who sit on various specialized federal courts.”).
19 Wahlbeck, supra note 8, at 1730.
20 Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 904 (1953).
21 Totenberg, supra note 12.

2022]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS IN OCTOBER TERM 2019

1331

inevitably lead to tension on the Court.”22 In addition to any policy
and peacemaking goals the Chief Justice may have, the assignment
power can be employed to “enhance the legitimacy of the Court’s
opinions . . . and ensure that the Court completes its work in a timely
fashion.”23
The most direct way in which the Chief Justice can use the
assignment power to pursue his or her own objectives as to the
trajectory of the Court is through self-assignment of the majority
opinion. The tendency of Chief Justices to assign themselves
important opinions can be traced back to the Marshall Court.24 The
Chief has the most control over the scope and impact of the opinion
when he writes it himself. The Associate Justices understand this and
even “expect him to write in those [big] cases to lend the prestige of
his office to the Court’s pronouncements.”25 Because the Chief Justice
“occupies a singular role” in the mind of the American public as the
embodiment of the Court, a majority opinion penned by the Chief in
a divisive case can “serve[] a signaling function” to the country that
the issue has “received the Supreme Court’s full attention and that the
Court’s answer bears the imprimatur of the highest judicial officer in
the land.”26 Examples of self-assignment by former Chief Justices that
have had significant impact on the public perception of the Supreme
Court include landmark cases like Marbury v. Madison,27 Brown v. Board
of Education,28 and United States v. Nixon.29 Relatedly, data analysis of
the opinion assignments by all Chief Justices from 1921 (Taft) to 1973
(Burger) suggests that Chief Justices are more likely to assign
themselves “important” cases and unanimous decisions.30 Notably,
while Chief Justices are generally most likely to assign themselves
unanimous decisions, they are also more likely to assign themselves the
opinion in highly divided cases than in moderately divided cases.31
22 Wahlbeck, supra note 8, at 1730.
23 Id. at 1735.
24 See Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Roberts in His Own Voice: The Chief Justice’s SelfAssignment of Majority Opinions, 97 JUDICATURE 90, 91 (2013) (“Ever since John Marshall,
who replaced the early practice of seriatim opinions with a single opinion for the Court as
the norm, chief justices have been moved to assign themselves the most important
cases . . . .”).
25 Danelski, supra note 6, at 31.
26 Greenhouse, supra note 24, at 91.
27 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Chief Justice Marshall).
28 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Chief Justice Warren).
29 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Chief Justice Burger).
30 Elliot E. Slotnick, The Chief Justices and Self-Assignment of Majority Opinions: A Research
Note, 31 W. POL. Q. 219, 225 (1978) (“[E]ach Chief Justice has a higher [opinion assignment
rate] in important cases . . . . [and] Chief Justices seek to assert the symbolic nature of their
position by writing relatively often for unanimous Courts.”).
31 Id. at 224.
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This suggests that, although unanimous decisions are most preferable,
there may be an “added impetus for writing opinions for a highly
divided court” because “when a Chief Justice is in the unique position
of being able to make or break a given Court majority . . . his exercise
of the self-assignment prerogative gives him the potential to structure
and guide the parameters of the final majority decision.”32
Of course, a Chief Justice cannot assign every opinion to himself.
There is a “norm of equal distribution” among the Justices, and failure
to adhere to this distribution can be counterproductive to a goal of
cohesion on the Court.33 While they must strive to achieve equality,
and usually “achieve remarkably even distributions of opinions,” Chief
Justices are not precluded from “pursu[ing] strategic objectives” and
even “favoring those who are ideologically most like themselves.”34 In
making assignment decisions to the Associate Justices, some Chiefs
focus on policy considerations, while others are swayed by organizational concerns. “[T]he rational strategy” for a substantive policyoriented Chief Justice “is to assign the opinion to the justice whose
views are most like his own on the issue being decided.”35 In this way,
a Chief Justice most concerned with the impact on a given area of law
can assign opinions so as to maximize policy gain and minimize policy
loss.36
There are other strategic objectives, besides substantive policysetting, that a Chief Justice may consider in approaching the
assignment of opinions. Some Chief Justices have organizational
concerns: Chief Justice Rehnquist famously used the assignment
process in order to maximize efficiency and reduce the amount of time
between oral argument and the issuance of an opinion.37 Chief Justice
Rehnquist was open with the Justices about this goal, incentivizing
them to do their work quickly if they wanted the opportunity to write
more opinions later in the Term.38 A Chief Justice may also consider
the eventual reception of a published opinion when making the
opinion assignment. Having a stronger majority behind the decision
in a given case can “give weight and solidarity” to the opinion of the
32 Id.
33 Sara C. Benesh, Reginald S. Sheehan & Harold J. Spaeth, Equity in Supreme Court
Opinion Assignment, 39 JURIMETRICS 377, 377 (1999).
34 Id. at 389.
35 DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 174
(1976).
36 Wahlbeck, supra note 8, at 1733.
37 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 739 (“Although Rehnquist initially would seek to
distribute [opinions] equally each term, he would minimize assignments during the second
half of a term to a Justice who was slow to circulate a majority or dissenting opinion or to
vote in a case in which opinions had circulated.”).
38 Id.
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Court.39 Chief Justice Taft, for example, suggested that the Chief
Justice “is expected to promote teamwork by the Court” by seeking
more unanimous opinions and broader voting coalitions so that the
Court’s decisions can have more weight and influence.40 As such, a
Chief Justice with concerns about institutional legitimacy might seek
to use the assignment power in such a way as to attract the most
possible votes to a majority decision. A Chief Justice may also consider
ability and expertise when assigning authorship duties.41 When
making the assignment in a case that deals with a thorny issue of civil
procedure, for example, the Chief may choose a Justice with expertise
and scholarly interest in that area of the law to author the opinion.42
A Chief Justice risks drawing criticism when he uses the
assignment power too overtly to his own benefit. Chief Justice Burger,
for example, infamously used his assignment power in a way that
created “a frayed and bitter Court full of needless strains and
quarrels.”43 Some of Burger’s colleagues “resented his perceived
practice of deferring initial comment [at conference] and then
strategically voting with the winning side so he, rather than Douglas or
Brennan, would assign the Court’s opinion.”44 Justice Stevens
observed that Chief Justice Burger would assign the opinions in
contentious First Amendment cases “to himself when the First
Amendment claim was vindicated but to Byron White when the
opinion would receive a hostile reception on the editorial pages.”45
When making opinion assignments, a Chief Justice must take into
account the norms of equitable opinion distribution and the risk of
angering his or her colleagues with obvious self-dealing while still
seeking to achieve any policy and organizational goals he may have.
It is significant that the considerations discussed up until this
point hinge on the assumption that the Chief Justice is in the majority

39 See Danelski, supra note 6, at 34 (quoting William Howard Taft, Draft of a Tribute
to Edward Douglass White (c. May 1921)).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 33.
42 The late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example, as a former professor of civil
procedure, was often assigned majority opinions related to procedural issues throughout
her tenure on the Court, including by Chief Justice Roberts. Herma Hill Kay, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Professor of Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004); see, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
43 Wahlbeck, supra note 8, at 1730–31 (quoting Draft Letter from Justice William O.
Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (May 1, 1972)).
44 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 737. It seems that Chief Justice Burger also did himself
no favors by “moving a desk into the Court’s conference room and appropriating it as his
reception room.” Id.
45 Greenhouse, supra note 24, at 94 (quoting JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A
SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 236 (2011)).
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and, as such, eligible to make the assignment. The Chief Justice is still
“functionally dependent on the agreement of at least half of his peers
to achieve his preferred result or rationale.”46 When the Chief Justice
is not in the majority, the most senior Justice in the majority makes the
assignment for the Court.47 Therefore, voting in the majority is of the
utmost importance for a Chief Justice hoping to control the direction
of the Court in a given area. Theoretically, a Chief Justice may choose
to vote in the majority, even when his personal ideology would point
him in a different direction, so that he can control the assignment of
the majority opinion or so that he can preserve the perceived
institutional legitimacy of the Court. By joining the majority and
assigning the opinion to a Justice who will craft a narrow holding, a
Chief Justice can try to ensure that in an area of the law which he does
not want to shift, “the opinion of the Court may be of limited
consequence.”48 This concern is especially salient in narrow decisions
where the Chief Justice could be the deciding vote, a position in which
Chief Justice Roberts is increasingly finding himself.
II.

OCTOBER TERM 2019

The conclusion of October Term 2019 presents a distinct
opportunity to reflect on Chief Justice Roberts’s voting patterns for
several reasons. This Term marked Roberts’s fifteenth year on the
Court, and while there was some commentary on his voting and
assignment choices following his first few years on the bench,49 there
has been little comprehensive analysis in the years since. The
confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett following the death of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in September 2020 may serve to shift the
balance among the Justices moving forward,50 such that October Term
2019 represents the last time for a while that Chief Justice Roberts
occupies the “pivotal” center seat ideologically.51 October Term 2019
was also “unlike any other” for a few reasons unrelated to the Justices

46 Ruger, supra note 7, at 1552.
47 Benesh et al., supra note 33, at 378.
48 Abe Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The Enigma of Leadership, 84 YALE L.J. 405, 405
(1975).
49 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 24, at 95–96 (commenting on Roberts’s selfassignment patterns after his first eight terms).
50 See Amy Coney Barrett Will Be Asked to Rule on Election Disputes and Much More,
ECONOMIST (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/10/26/amyconey-barrett-will-be-asked-to-rule-on-election-disputes-and-much-more [https://perma.cc
/3D8P-AT8S] (noting that while “[e]very appointment to America’s Supreme Court ushers
in ‘a new court,’” Barrett’s confirmation to the late Justice Ginsburg’s former seat “could
skew the ideological balance on the court for decades”).
51 See Liptak, supra note 11.
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themselves.52 The outbreak of the novel Coronavirus in the spring of
2020 postponed scheduled arguments and led to the release of several
opinions in July, a rarity in the Court’s history.53 The Court issued its
fewest number of signed decisions since the Civil War.54 Another
change came in the format of oral arguments—the Supreme Court
conducted oral arguments over the phone, and provided a livestream
for the public to listen in, for the first time ever.55
Observers, however, suggested that the Term was most notable in
that there were a number of cases in which conservative Justices, led by
Chief Justice Roberts, surprised the country by ruling with the liberal
wing of the Court in some hot-button, politically charged cases.56 Some
claimed that Roberts had “abandoned principle in an effort to protect
the court’s reputation—and his own—from accusations that it is a
political institution.”57 Regardless of opinion as to the policy outcomes
of the cases, one thing was clear: Chief Justice Roberts’s vote in
October Term 2019 was the “crucial one.”58 With the highest rate of
majority voting since Chief Justice Hughes in 1938, Roberts’s sharpest
tool for directing the Court strategically through the thorny issues it
faced was the assignment power.59

52 Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2019, SCOTUSBLOG (July 10, 2020),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/final-stat-pack-for-october-term-2019/
[https://
perma.cc/J9WE-4WCX].
53 See id.; Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Postpones More Arguments Amid Coronavirus
Outbreak, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/03
/supreme-court-postpones-more-arguments-due-to-virus-164000
[https://perma.cc
/ANK2-S68L].
54 See Feldman, supra note 52 (“The 53 signed decisions represent the court’s lowest
number since 41 in OT 1862 during the Civil War.”).
55 See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court to Continue Hearing Oral Arguments by Telephone
Next Month, CNN (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/16/politics/supremecourt-oral-arguments-teleconference/index.html [https://perma.cc/M974-DASD]. This
format was generally well-received, but the Court resumed in-person arguments in October
2021. Becky Sullivan, The U.S. Supreme Court Will Resume In-Person Oral Arguments This Fall,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/08/1035107155/the-us-supreme-court-will-resume-in-person-oral-arguments-this-fall [https://perma.cc/LDD9P77Z].
56 See Liptak, supra note 11 (“In a series of stunning decisions over the past two weeks,
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has voted to expand L.G.B.T.Q. rights, protect the young
immigrants known as Dreamers and strike down a Louisiana abortion law. In all three
decisions, he voted with the court’s four-member liberal wing.”).
57 Id. Citing an earlier rebuke of President Trump, see infra note 133 and
accompanying text, some also claimed that Roberts’s voting patterns in October Term 2019
were “at least partly based on a distaste for Mr. Trump” himself. Liptak, supra note 11.
58 Liptak, supra note 11.
59 Id. (“To be both the chief justice and the swing vote confers extraordinary
power. . . . He uses that power strategically, picking colleagues likely to write broadly or
narrowly and saving important decisions for himself.”).
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A. Roberts by the Numbers
The total number of cases with authored opinions in which Chief
Justice Roberts voted from the start of his career on the Supreme Court
through the close of October Term 2019 is more than 990.60 About
880 of those he voted with the majority. There has been notable
variation across terms:
October Term
200561
200662
200763
200864
200965
201066
201167
201268
201369

Frequency in the Majority
92.4
88.4
89.7
81
91
91
92
86
92

60 The total number of cases with authored opinions in which Chief Justice Roberts
has voted since the start of his career on the Supreme Court is approximately 992, and in
889 of those he voted with the majority. These figures do not include per curiam opinions
or cases in which the Chief Justice did not take part. Throughout this Section, where not
otherwise specified, the aggregate opinion authorship and assignment data referred to has
been compiled from the SCOTUSblog annual Stat Packs and the Georgetown Supreme
Court Institute. See Stat Pack Archive, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com
/reference/stat-pack/ [https://perma.cc/4TR2-SPD7] (data from October Term 2006
through October Term 2019); GEORGETOWN UNIV. L. CTR. SUP. CT. INST., SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 2005 OVERVIEW (2006) [hereinafter OT 2005
OVERVIEW] (data for October Term 2005).
61 OT 2005 OVERVIEW, supra note 60, at 3.
62 SCOTUSBLOG.COM & AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, SCOTUSBLOG
SUPER STATPACK—OT07 TERM RECAP (2008) [hereinafter OT 2007 STAT PACK].
63 Id.
64 SCOTUSBLOG, SCOTUSBLOG STATPACK FINAL DATA 6.29.09, at 8 (2009)
[hereinafter OT 2008 STAT PACK].
65 SCOTUSBLOG, SCOTUSBLOG FINAL STATS OT09, at 6 (2010) [hereinafter OT
2009 STAT PACK].
66 SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2010, at 10 (2011) [hereinafter OT
2010 STAT PACK].
67 SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2011, at 13 (2012) [hereinafter OT
2011 STAT PACK].
68 SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2012, at 13 (2013) [hereinafter OT
2012 STAT PACK].
69 SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2013, at 19 (2014) [hereinafter OT
2013 STAT PACK].
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201571
201672
201773
201874
201975
Average
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80
92
93
93
85
97
89.6

Given the context of this variation in frequency, this Section will
examine Roberts’s patterns of self-assignment of majority opinions,
assignment to other Justices with whom he has both high and low
average rates of alignment, and authorship of nonmajority opinions in
October Term 2019. Additionally, this Section will compare these
statistics to Chief Justice Roberts’s assignment and voting patterns
across all terms and in terms where he voted less frequently in the
majority in order to analyze what differences, if any, this historic Term
presents.
The Court issued fifty-three signed merits opinions during
October Term 2019.76 Of these fifty-three, Chief Justice Roberts voted
with the majority in fifty-one cases.77 The distribution of majority
opinion authorship across the Justices was fairly even, with each Justice
writing between five and seven majority opinions during the Term.78
Chief Justice Roberts assigned himself seven of the majority opinions,
all of which were in divided cases.79 Four of these opinions were
decided by a vote of five-to-four and the rest were in cases with sevenmember majorities.80 Seven decisions is well within the normal range
70 SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2014, at 21 (2015) [hereinafter OT
2014 STAT PACK].
71 SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2015, at 21 (2016) [hereinafter OT
2015 STAT PACK].
72 SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2016, at 17 (2017) [hereinafter OT
2016 STAT PACK].
73 SCOTUSBLOG, FINAL STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2017, at 17 (2018)
[hereinafter OT 2017 STAT PACK].
74 SCOTUSBLOG, FINAL STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2018, at 17 (2019)
[hereinafter OT 2018 STAT PACK].
75 SCOTUSBLOG, FINAL STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2019, at 15 (2020)
[hereinafter OT 2019 STAT PACK].
76 Id. at 1.
77 Roberts voted with the majority in fifty-nine cases this Term, six of which were
summary reversals and two of which were per curiam merits opinions. Id. at 1, 15.
78 Id. at 13. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch each wrote seven majority
opinions, while Justices Ginsburg, Alito, Kagan, and Kavanaugh authored six apiece and
Justices Thomas, Breyer, and Sotomayor each wrote five. Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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of self-assigned opinions for the Chief Justice,81 but the distribution was
notable in that it was the first time ever that Roberts assigned himself
zero unanimous opinions.82 It is also notable that this Term tied
Roberts’s record for self-assigned five-member majority opinions.83
October Term 2019 represents the first time that, of the majority
opinions Chief Justice Roberts has assigned himself, most were fivefour opinions and none were unanimous. The average strength of the
majority for which he wrote the opinion was 5.9.84 In October Term
2014, the year in which Chief Justice Roberts’s frequency in the
majority was the lowest, he self-assigned two five-four decisions, one sixthree decision, one seven-two decision, two eight-one decisions, and
one unanimous decision, resulting in an average majority strength of
6.9.85
Chief Justice Roberts assigned the other forty-four opinions in
which he voted with the majority to his fellow Justices.86 Only one
Justice, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, finished the Term with a lower
average strength of majority than Chief Justice Roberts.87 Of the eleven
five-four majority opinions assigned by Roberts this term, four he
assigned to himself, four more he assigned to Justice Kavanaugh, two
81 During October Terms 2015 and 2017, Chief Justice Roberts authored only six
opinions. See OT 2015 STAT PACK, supra note 71, at 17; OT 2017 STAT PACK, supra note 73,
at 13. In every other term, Roberts has authored either seven or eight majority opinions.
See, e.g., OT 2016 STAT PACK, supra note 72, at 13.
82 Chief Justice Roberts had authored just one unanimous opinion in each of four
previous terms. See OT 2009 STAT PACK, supra note 65, at 7; OT 2014 STAT PACK, supra note
70, at 17; OT 2018 STAT PACK, supra note 74, at 14; see also SCOTUSBLOG, SUPREME COURT
VOTING LINEUPS IN OCTOBER TERM 2008, at 33 (2009), https://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/06/full-stat-pack-part-ii-visuals.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7LAS2RZ] (showing that in October Term 2008, Roberts authored only one unanimous
opinion in the case of Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns. Inc.). Based on voting
lineup data compiled from the Oyez case database, Chief Justice Roberts authored a record
high six unanimous opinions in his first Term. See 2005-2006 Term, OYEZ, https://
www.oyez.org/cases/2005 [https://perma.cc/WZ8R-LZKL].
83 Roberts wrote four five-member controlling opinions only twice before: in October
Terms 2006 and 2018. See SCOTUSBLOG & AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, ENDOF-TERM “SUPER STATPACK”—OT06 (2007) [hereinafter OT 2006 STAT PACK] (noting that
Roberts wrote three five-to-four majority opinions and one five-to-four plurality, which it
treated as a majority opinion); OT 2018 STAT PACK, supra note 74, at 14.
84 OT 2019 STAT PACK, supra note 75, at 13.
85 OT 2014 STAT PACK, supra note 70, at 17.
86 For the other two opinions, the most senior Justice in the majority assigned
authorship, as is customary. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. In Ramos v. Louisiana,
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), the most senior Justice in the majority was Justice Thomas, who
assigned the opinion to Justice Gorsuch. Gorsuch was also assigned the majority opinion
in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), this time by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
87 Justice Kavanaugh’s average strength of majority for October Term 2019 was 5.5,
slightly lower than Chief Justice Roberts’s average of 5.9. OT 2019 STAT PACK, supra note
75, at 13.
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he assigned to Justice Samuel Alito, and one was authored by Justice
Stephen Breyer.88 Some Justices, however, were assigned opinions with
much stronger majorities: Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Elena Kagan,
and Sonia Sotomayor all finished the term, on average, writing for a
majority greater than eight.89 Notably, Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor have much lower average rates of alignment90 with Chief
Justice Roberts in divided cases as compared to the other members of
the Court.91 When including unanimous cases, however, Chief Justice
Roberts’s average rates of alignment with Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor are much higher,92 as are the alignment rates of all Justices
when the Court’s many unanimous decisions are taken into account.
Justice Breyer, who was assigned one five-four case, wrote for a lower
majority on average during the Term but has the third-lowest average
rate of alignment with Chief Justice Roberts of the members of the
Court in 2019.93 Justices Neil Gorsuch and Clarence Thomas wrote for
average majorities of similar strength that were slightly narrower than
their more liberal counterparts,94 though it is important to note that
two of Gorsuch’s opinions for narrower majorities came in the two
cases that Chief Justice Roberts did not assign this Term.95 Justices
Gorsuch and Thomas also have similar average rates of alignment with
Chief Justice Roberts during their tenure on the Court, both in divided
cases and overall, which are markedly higher than those of Justices

88 Id.
89 Id. Ginsburg finished with the highest average, 8.5, writing sixty-seven percent of
her assigned majority opinions for a unanimous Court. Id. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan
each ended the Term with writing for an average majority of 8.2. Id.
90 Rates of alignment represent how often two Justices voted together on the merits
in a given Term. Throughout the discussion, the average rates of alignment referenced
were compiled by averaging the alignment rates between Chief Justice Roberts and the
other members of the Court for each Term from 2006 to 2019 published in the annual
SCOTUSblog Stat Packs. See Stat Pack Archive, supra note 60. The data for October Term
2005 was sourced from the Georgetown Supreme Court Institute. See OT 2005 OVERVIEW,
supra note 60, at 9.
91 Justice Roberts’s average rates of alignment in divided cases with Justices Ginsburg,
Kagan, and Sotomayor are 44.8%, 60.8%, and 52.2%, respectively. Together with Justice
Breyer’s average alignment rate of 53.9%, these are the four Justices voting in October Term
2019 with the lowest average rates of alignment over their tenure on the Court with Chief
Justice Roberts.
92 However, they are still three of the four lowest average rates among Justices on the
Court in 2019. Chief Justice Roberts’s overall average rates of alignment with Justices
Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer are 69.3%, 75%, 72.2%, and 74.1%, respectively.
93 See OT 2019 STAT PACK, supra note 75, at 13 (listing Breyer’s average majority as
7.2).
94 Gorsuch and Thomas wrote for average majorities of 7.6 and 7.2, respectively. Id.
95 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer.96 Justice Alito wrote for the
next lowest average majority in October Term 2019, behind Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh.97 Of the Justices on the Court
in 2019, Justice Alito has the second highest average rate of alignment
with Chief Justice Roberts during his tenure.98 The standout in Chief
Justice Roberts’s assignment patterns this term, however, comes with
respect to Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Roberts assigned Justice
Kavanaugh as many five-four decisions as he assigned himself.99
Kavanaugh is the only Justice besides Chief Justice Roberts who did not
author a unanimous opinion this Term.100 While Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kavanaugh have only served on the Court together for two
years, Kavanaugh has the highest average rate of alignment with
Roberts, both in divided cases and overall, of any other Justice whom
Roberts has served with on the Court since his confirmation in 2005.101
In October Term 2014, when Chief Justice Roberts voted with the
majority only eighty percent of the time,102 the distribution of opinion
authorship across strong and weak majorities was more even. Each
Justice wrote at least one unanimous opinion103 and everyone except
Justice Thomas wrote at least one five-four opinion.104 Eight of the
nine Justices finished that Term having authored opinions with an
average majority between 6.3 and 7.4.105
Another area of note in October Term 2019 related to Chief
Justice Roberts’s choices in opinion assignment and authorship comes
in the form of concurrences and dissents. While Chief Justice Roberts
has averaged 1.8 concurrences and 3.5 dissents per term since he

96 In divided cases, Gorsuch and Thomas’s average rates of alignment with Chief
Justice Roberts are 67% and 67.6%, respectively. Overall, Gorsuch’s average rate of
alignment is 80.8% and Thomas’s is 82%.
97 See OT 2019 STAT PACK, supra note 75, at 13 (average majority strength of 6.8).
98 Alito, who like Roberts was nominated to the Court by President George W. Bush
in 2005, has an average rate of alignment with Roberts of 77.7%. See Laura Sullivan, Bush
Taps Alito for Supreme Court Vacancy, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 31, 2005), https://www.npr
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4982338 [https://perma.cc/53A6-F34T].
99 See OT 2019 STAT PACK, supra note 75, at 13.
100 Id. Like Chief Justice Roberts, the narrowest majority Justice Kavanaugh was
assigned this Term was seven-two. Id.
101 Kavanaugh and Roberts have aligned in 88.5% of divided cases and 92.5% of cases
overall on average since Kavanaugh joined the Court in October Term 2018.
102 OT 2014 STAT PACK, supra note 70, at 21.
103 See id. at 17. Justice Thomas wrote six unanimous majority opinions that term, the
most of any Justice and double that of the next closest Justices. Id.
104 Id. No Justice wrote more than three five-four opinions in October Term 2014. Id.
105 Id. Only Justice Thomas fell outside that range, writing for an average majority of
8.6. Id.
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joined the Court,106 in October Term 2019 he wrote only one
concurrence and one dissent.107 This was the first year that Chief
Justice Roberts wrote just one dissent in a term. In contrast, Chief
Justice Roberts authored two concurrences and five dissents during
October Term 2014.108 Chief Justice Roberts has authored a record
high of nine nonmajority opinions in three prior terms.109
B. Case Studies
While many cases decided in October Term 2019 received
widespread media coverage, three in particular warrant special
attention given the way in which Chief Justice Roberts voted and
assigned the majority opinions. In June Medical, the Court considered
a Louisiana law that required physicians who performed abortions in
the state to have active admitting privileges at a hospital.110 Justice
Breyer wrote an opinion declaring the law unconstitutional for a
plurality including Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor in which
Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion.111 As Roberts pointed
out in his concurrence, the law at issue was “nearly identical”112 to a
Texas law that had been struck down by the Court just four years prior
in Whole Woman’s Health.113 According to Roberts, despite the fact that
he had dissented in Whole Woman’s Health and “continue[s] to believe
that the case was wrongly decided,” the fate of the Louisiana law was
controlled by the Court’s prior decision because the doctrine of
“[s]tare decisis instructs [the Court] to treat like cases alike.”114
In DHS v. Regents, Chief Justice Roberts joined Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in a five-four majority finding that,
because the Department of Homeland Security did not supply a
“reasoned analysis” for its decision to end the DACA program, the
decision was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the
106 These averages were calculated by compiling the numbers of concurrences and
dissents Chief Justice Roberts wrote in each Term as published in the SCOTUSblog annual
Stat Packs. See Stat Pack Archive, supra note 60. The data for October Term 2005 was sourced
from the Georgetown Supreme Court Institute. See OT 2005 OVERVIEW, supra note 60, at
7.
107 See OT 2019 STAT PACK, supra note 75, at 11.
108 See OT 2014 STAT PACK, supra note 70, at 8.
109 See OT 2007 STAT PACK, supra note 62, at 14 (five concurrences and four dissents);
OT 2008 STAT PACK, supra note 64, at 1 (four concurrences and five dissents); OT 2012 STAT
PACK, supra note 68, at 8 (two concurrences and seven dissents).
110 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020).
111 Id. at 2109, 2133.
112 Id. at 2133.
113 Id. at 2133. See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292
(2016).
114 June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2133, 2141–42.
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Administrative Procedure Act.115 Chief Justice Roberts assigned
himself authorship duties and wrote a majority opinion that focused
narrowly on the Department’s procedural shortcomings in making the
decision to end the program, rather than any policy arguments as to
“whether DACA or its recission are sound.”116 Roberts reasoned that
by “fail[ing] to consider the conspicuous issues of whether to retain
forbearance and what if anything to do about the hardship to DACA
recipients,” DHS failed to provide a reasoned explanation in
accordance with the APA’s procedural requirements, and remanded
the issue to DHS “so that it may consider the problem anew.”117
The same week, the Court also issued its decision in Bostock v.
Clayton County.118 In Bostock, Chief Justice Roberts joined a six-member
majority comprised of himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch which concluded that terminating
employment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity ran
afoul of Title VII’s “command” that it is unlawful for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of sex.119 Roberts assigned the majority
opinion to Justice Gorsuch, who wrote a decision focused on the clear
meaning of the language of Title VII.120 According to Justice Gorsuch,
because “[a]n employer who fires an individual for being homosexual
or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have
questioned in members of a different sex,” this type of discrimination
falls within the “express terms” of Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination.121 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion applied traditionally
conservative canons of interpretation to reach the conclusion that the
types of discrimination at issue fell within the plain terms of the statute,
an approach that drew criticism from his dissenting colleagues.122
These cases, when viewed in connection with Chief Justice
Roberts’s assignment patterns in October Term 2019, as compared to
his patterns in previous terms, provide the basis from which we can

115 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901, 1913
(2020).
116 Id. at 1916. In one of the dissents, Justice Thomas characterized “[t]he majority’s
demanding review of DHS’ [sic] decisionmaking process” as “especially perverse.” Id. at
1926 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117 Id. at 1916 (majority opinion).
118 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
119 Id. at 1737–38.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1737 (“Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly
what Title VII forbids.”).
122 In his dissent, Justice Alito compared the majority opinion to a “pirate ship” that
“sails under a textualist flag, but . . . actually represents . . . a theory of statutory
interpretation that Justice Scalia excoriated.” Id. at 1755–56 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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analyze his assignment approach and how, if at all, it allows him to
meaningfully steer the direction of the Court.
III.

THE ASSIGNMENT CONCERNS OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS

In order to effectively analyze the considerations that may shape
Chief Justice Roberts’s decisionmaking, it is important to start with the
context in which he first came to the Court. Roberts has been
described as an “accidental” Chief Justice due to the fact that he was
first nominated to succeed Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in
July 2005.123 Before he was confirmed, and following the unexpected
death of Roberts’s mentor, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, President
George W. Bush withdrew Roberts’s first nomination and nominated
him instead to take Rehnquist’s seat as Chief.124 These unusual
circumstances meant that Roberts became the Chief Justice less than a
month before a new term was set to begin, and was not only the new
Chief, but also the first new Justice to join the Court in eleven years.125
In this setting, Roberts made it a “priority of his first term to promote
unanimity and collegiality.”126 After his first term, Roberts’s understanding of success as a Chief Justice could be summed up in one word:
consensus. Asked directly about his use of the assignment power soon
after becoming Chief Justice, Roberts was clear that he intended “to
use his power to achieve as broad a consensus as possible.”127
He acknowledged that this approach might be perceived on the Court as a
more controversial use of the assignment power than Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s stated policy of punishing only those justices who were slow in
producing opinions. Roberts’s colleagues were likely to understand a
neutral policy that denied them new assignments when they were late with
opinions, he said, but they might well object if they felt that he was giving
the plum assignments to those justices who agreed with him. Roberts
wanted to make clear that he would instead reward those who write
opinions in ways that might attract more votes, regardless of their
ideological orientation.128

Chief Justice Roberts’s emphasis on consensus and unanimity is
shaped, in part, by his desire to retain bipartisan confidence in the
Court. A Court with a higher degree of consensus is less likely to be
perceived as making decisions along the party lines of the President
123 Greenhouse, supra note 24, at 91, 94.
124 See Richard W. Stevenson, President Names Roberts as Choice for Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
6,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/06/politics/politicsspecial1
/president-names-roberts-as-choice-for-chief.html [https://perma.cc/D4US-J26V].
125 Greenhouse, supra note 24, at 94.
126 Rosen, supra note 5.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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that appointed them.129 Part of the issue, according to Roberts, is the
“personalization of judicial politics.”130 “[J]ustices who act more like
legal academics than members of a collegial Court . . . who seem more
interested in demonstrating their jurisprudential consistency by
writing opinions that read like law-review articles than in finding
common ground with their colleagues” make this personalization
more apparent, and stoke Roberts’s commitment to achieving
consensus on narrow holdings.131 At the beginning of his tenure,
Roberts noted that the intense polarization of the country made it
especially important to “resist the politicization of the judiciary.”132
Fifteen years later, this could be more true than ever before. Chief
Justice Roberts conveyed this sentiment clearly when he issued a rare
political rebuke in November 2018—after President Donald Trump
referred to a district judge who ruled against one of his policies as an
“Obama judge,” Roberts “defended the independence and integrity
of the federal judiciary” by making a “blunt statement” reiterating that
“[w]e do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or
Clinton judges . . . [but we have] an extraordinary group of dedicated
judges doing their level best to do equal right to those appearing
before them.”133 That Chief Justice Roberts felt it necessary to issue
these remarks, against his usual tendency to stay firmly out of politics,
suggests the strength of his commitment to judicial integrity.
Chief Justice Roberts is “more interested in institutional
legitimacy than methodological purity.”134 Put differently, Chief
Justice Roberts is willing to vote with a majority to retain precedent
rather than vote according to his own jurisprudentially preferred
outcome. An analysis of his first five years as Chief Justice suggested
that “institutional concerns may guide his conduct to a greater degree
than that of most of his colleagues.”135 Roberts has observed that his
129 Id. (“Unanimous, or nearly unanimous, decisions are hard to overturn and
contribute to the stability of the law and the continuity of the Court; by contrast, closely
divided, 5–4 decisions make it harder for the public to respect the Court as an impartial
institution that transcends partisan politics.”).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. (“It’s a high priority to keep any kind of partisan divide out of the judiciary as
well.”).
133 Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama
Judge’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics
/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html [https://perma.cc/68P5-MV8P]. Chief Justice
Roberts continued to say that the “independent judiciary is something we should all be
thankful for.” Id.
134 Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts Is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed, THE ATLANTIC (July
14, 2020) https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/john-roberts-just-whosupreme-court-needed/614053/ [https://perma.cc/GRR7-594H].
135 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 754.

2022]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS IN OCTOBER TERM 2019

1345

predecessor, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, “was willing to join
opinions with which he disagreed as the sixth vote, but not as the
fifth—in other words, he would compromise for the good of the Court,
but only when his vote could not change the outcome.”136 Roberts
himself, on the other hand, is more open to joining majorities “to
foster institutional solidarity.”137 In October Term 2019, this was
evidenced most clearly by his vote in June Medical.138 Chief Justice
Roberts voted such that a statute “nearly identical” to a law invalidated
by the Court four years prior would be struck down, despite the fact
that he had been in the minority in the prior case.139 He made it clear
that although he still believed that the earlier case was wrongly
decided, respect for the doctrine of stare decisis dictated such a
result.140 This choice by Chief Justice Roberts is especially important
in relation to the institutional legitimacy of the Court, as it sent a signal
that changes on the bench will not change the Court’s commitment to
following precedent and should not open the door to those seeking
different outcomes in cases that are essentially identical to prior
cases.141 Especially in light of his recent remarks defending judicial
independence, this suggests that Roberts takes seriously his
commitment to avoiding politicization of the judiciary.142
This is not to say that Chief Justice Roberts has completely given
up on his own jurisprudence.143 Roberts faced criticism early on for
being unwilling to compromise on his principles, with some observers
commenting that he “might not be as conciliatory as he promised.”144
There is evidence from October Term 2019 that suggests that Roberts
may assign opinions with substantive policy in mind. In this vein, it is
notable that Chief Justice Roberts assigned himself and Justice
Kavanaugh, with whom he has a historically high average rate of
alignment, the vast majority of five-four cases this term.145 This suggests
that in these close cases, where a Chief Justice is often tempted to self-

136 Rosen, supra note 5 (“Rehnquist cared somewhat about building consensus, but
not all that much.”).
137 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 754.
138 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
139 Id. at 2133.
140 Id. at 2133, 2141–42.
141 See Liptak, supra note 11 (suggesting that Roberts voted in the majority in June
Medical partly because he “was offended by the idea that a change in the composition of the
court should warrant a different outcome in what was, at bottom, the identical case”).
142 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
143 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 756 (“Roberts clearly has not abandoned his convictions,
and in some areas he has aggressively pursued jurisprudential goals.”).
144 Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts Versus Roberts, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 2, 2010), https://
newrepublic.com/article/73200/roberts-versus-roberts [https://perma.cc/P7VB-87TT].
145 See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
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assign the opinion in order to “structure and guide the parameters of
the final majority decision,”146 Roberts could be making the next best
choice when he cannot self-assign by assigning to a Justice who votes
and thinks similarly. The idea that Roberts is assigning strategically is
further supported by the fact that the average strength of majority that
the Justices wrote for this term loosely correlated with their average
rate of alignment with Chief Justice Roberts.147 In other words, the less
likely Chief Justice Roberts is to agree with another Justice based on
their historical voting patterns, the more likely he was in October Term
2019 to assign them unanimous opinions, where their rates of
alignment are much higher. Relatedly, when Chief Justice Roberts
votes in divided cases with his more liberal colleagues, he often assigns
the opinion to himself or to the most conservative Justice joining him
in the majority.148 Given the fact that Chief Justices in the past have
been found most likely to assign themselves the majority opinion in
unanimous cases,149 it is interesting that Chief Justice Roberts selfassigned zero unanimous cases this term, a first since he took the
center seat fifteen years ago.150 The fact that he tended to assign
himself highly divided cases instead suggests that the Chief may have
found writing the opinion in these cases and determining the breadth
of the holdings especially important.
However, these assignment choices can also be viewed as a
method of coalition building. As he stated at the beginning of his
tenure, one of Chief Justice Roberts’s main goals in the assignment
process is consensus.151 By assigning the opinion to someone who will
write a more narrow holding, Chief Justice Roberts can attract a larger
group of Justices to vote with the majority, which in turn adds to the

146 Slotnick, supra note 30, at 224. A notable example of Robert’s self-assignment this
term is DHS v. Regents, where he voted with the more liberal Justices in a case that attracted
much partisan attention, but wrote a narrow, procedurally focused opinion that remanded
the issue to the Department, allowing them to reconsider the issue. See supra notes 115–17
and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 86–105 and accompanying text.
148 Of the fifteen five- or six-member majority opinions Chief Justice Roberts assigned
this term, only three were assigned to a Justice who traditionally votes more liberally than
Roberts. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (opinion authored by
Justice Breyer); Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (opinion authored by Justice
Kagan), Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (opinion authored by
Justice Breyer).
149 See Slotnick, supra note 30, at 225.
150 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The fact that Roberts self-assigned highly
divided cases does align with Slotnick’s assertion that, when not writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justices are more likely to write for highly divided, rather than moderately
divided, courts. See Slotnick, supra note 30, at 224.
151 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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legitimacy of the Court.152 An example of this came in the assignment
of the majority in Bostock to Justice Gorsuch153: Gorsuch may not have
joined an opinion authored by another Justice who reached the same
result on different grounds of interpretation. In this way, Roberts is
able to use the assignment power to create opinions that generate
greater consensus on the Court.
Drawing inspiration from his role model, John Marshall, Chief
Justice Roberts noted at the beginning of his tenure that he would seek
as many unanimous opinions, and as few concurring and dissenting
opinions, as possible.154 Early in his time on the Court, it was observed
that Roberts held himself to those standards.155 This was also true in
October Term 2019, when Roberts authored just one concurrence and
one dissent, falling below his already low rates of nonmajority opinion
authorship.156 However, it is important to note that his record low rate
of concurrence and dissent came in a term where he was in the
majority and able to assign the opinion almost all of the time, not
creating many situations in which he may have felt the need to write
separately.157 Observers have noted that Roberts’s rare concurrences
are sometimes used in cases where he feels the need to explain the
majority’s decision in order to retain institutional legitimacy.158 His
lone concurrence this term in June Medical could be characterized in
such a way: Chief Justice Roberts used much of his opinion to describe
why it was necessary for the Court to adhere to precedent, despite his
personal opinions about the reasoning of the prior case.159 These types
of concurrences provide further evidence of Chief Justice Roberts’s
commitment to retaining the institutional legitimacy of the Court.

152 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
154 See Rosen, supra note 5 (“In particular, Roberts declared, he would make it his
priority, as Marshall did, to discourage his colleagues from issuing separate opinions.”).
155 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 754 (“[H]e writes fewer dissenting opinions than does
virtually any other Justice.”). While this figure was explained in part by the fact that Roberts
is so often in the majority, Goldstein found that his rate of dissent was still lower than Justices
with similarly high majority rates. Id.
156 See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
157 In October Term 2014, on the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts wrote two
concurrences and five dissents while voting in the majority only eighty percent of the time.
See OT 2014 STAT PACK, supra note 70, at 8, 21.
158 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 756 (“[Roberts’s] concurring opinion in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, in which he defended the majority’s opinion from the charge
that it reflected judicial activism in reaching to decide an issue not necessarily before the
Court and in not according proper respect to precedent, reflects concerns regarding the
Court’s institutional standing.”(internal citation omitted)).
159 See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
When Chief Justice Roberts committed to “call[ing] balls and
strikes” during his confirmation hearings in 2005, he committed to
“decid[ing] every case based on the record, according to the rule of
law, without fear or favor.”160 Repeatedly, he has publicly announced
his commitment to institutional legitimacy, putting precedent above
the politicization of the judiciary and resisting the personalization of
judicial decisionmaking by prioritizing consensus among his
colleagues. One of the most powerful ways in which he is able to
achieve these goals is through the assignment of majority opinions.
Voting in the majority at an unprecedented rate for a Chief Justice,
October Term 2019 presented an opportunity for Roberts to use this
power to nearly always achieve his policy preferences. However, the
commitment to fairness evoked by his original “balls and strikes”
metaphor rang true. Taking the results of October Term 2019 into
account, it appears that Chief Justice Roberts used this largely
unprecedented power as both a swing vote and the assignor of the
majority opinion in a way that aligned with his signature commitment
to consensus and legitimacy of the Court. This term, he “voted with
liberal and conservative justices at roughly equivalent rates.”161 While
the data compiled in this Note suggests that Roberts is able to, and
sometimes does, use the assignment power to reach the substantive
outcome he prefers when he is in the majority, he is also careful to vote
and assign in a way that is meant to create greater consensus and faith
in the legitimacy of the Court. On the whole, Chief Justice Roberts has
demonstrated a commitment to precedent and institutional
legitimacy, while remaining grounded in his conservative roots.162
It is important to note that this discussion aimed only to make
observations about Chief Justice Roberts’s voting and assignment
choices in October Term 2019 and what these patterns suggest about
his concerns and goals for the Court. More comprehensive research
is needed to analyze Roberts’s voting and assignment choices
throughout his tenure, and more research will be needed as the Court
moves forward. Roberts is only sixty-five and has good reason to believe
he will be in the center chair for years to come.163 Recent changes on
the bench, however, suggest that the type of control Roberts exerted
this term may not be possible in the near future. In October Term
2020, the arrival of Justice Amy Coney Barrett shifted the ideological
160 Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 56.
161 Liptak, supra note 11.
162 Id. (“An incrementalist and an institutionalist, [Roberts] generally nudges the
court to the right in small steps, with one eye on its prestige and legitimacy.”).
163 Id.
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balance of the Court such that the conservative wing of the Court now
holds a six-member majority, “thrusting the chief justice out of his spot
at the court’s ideological center” and potentially placing Justice
Kavanaugh at the median.164 While it is not yet clear how this change
will play out, Justice Kavanaugh’s record of voting similarly to Chief
Justice Roberts suggests that Roberts will continue to be in the majority
and assigning opinions in many key cases. Kavanaugh’s recent
opinions in the highly politicized voting cases leading up to the 2020
presidential election, however, suggest that he may be less concerned
with avoiding partisan issues than the Chief,165 presenting potential
conflicts the Chief Justice will have to face. Chief Justice Roberts’s
concern with creating consensus and preserving faith in the legitimacy
of the Court, as evidenced by his voting and assignment in October
Term 2019, is sure to guide his decisionmaking going forward and may
prove to be more important than ever before as concerns about the
polarization of the judiciary continue to grow.

164 Adam Liptak, In Voting Cases, Chief Justice Roberts Is Alone but in Control, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/29/us/john-roberts-supreme-courtvoting.html [https://perma.cc/E32S-GTHE].
165 Id. Kavanaugh’s votes on both sides of election issues in cases following a
concurrence that “attracted considerable attention” for its perceived partisanship and
factual errors, however, suggest that he may be willing to take these concerns into account.
Id.
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